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House Rules: Why Implementing Express 
Rules Governing Conflicts of Laws Absent 
Parties Explicit Choice will Strengthen 
International Arbitration Tribunals  
SAIKRISHNA SRIKANTH*© 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1865, England became the first nation to accept private parties’ right to decide 
the proper law of their contract, thereby greenlighting party autonomy as a 
foundational principle in choice of law jurisprudence.1 As choice of law 
jurisprudence evolved from litigating issues in courts to parties utilizing their 
autonomy to have an arbitration house manage their agreement, commercial 
arbitration has boomed.2 By choosing arbitration, parties are free to select various 
procedural and substantive rules that they believe will best regulate any dispute 
that may arise from their agreement.3 Furthermore, private parties retain the 
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 1. See Karen Denise Untiedt, International Contracts under the Conflict of Laws Rules of Great Britain and 
Japan, 7 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 193, 198 (1984) (explaining that England was the first country to allow parties 
to choose the governing law of their contract and thereby recognizing party autonomy); see also Ole Lando, 
The Substantive Rules in the Conflict of Laws: Comparative Comments from the Law of Contracts, 11 TEX. INT’L L. 
J. 505, 523 (1976) (“The distinction between private law and public law rules has been a basic one in civil law 
where many authors and courts still maintain that the normal conflict of law rules only refer to substantive 
rules of private law.”). 
 2. See Stavros Brekoulakis, International Arbitration Scholarship and the Concept of Arbitration Law, 36 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 745, 766 (2013) (“In the area of commercial arbitration, for example, it is now accepted that 
tribunals have authority to determine not only commercial claims pertaining to the formation, interpretation, 
and performance of a commercial contract, but also statutory claims that may have crucial social implications 
or involve public policy.”). 
 3. See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 849 (1961) (“The simplest 
[setting for arbitration] is when two persons in a contract delineating a business relationship agree to settle any 
disputes that may arise under the contract by resort to arbitration before named arbitrators or persons to be 
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freedom to determine the location of their arbitration, irrespective of whether the 
parties themselves are physically present in these settings.4 Such flexibility in rules 
bolstered parties’ desire for arbitration and emboldened the formation of 
arbitration houses in major commercial centers across the globe.5  
The establishment and subsequent growth of major international arbitration 
houses is directly tied to the rules that govern each house.6 Since different houses 
offer different rules, parties are free to decide which house’s rules are best suited 
to govern the parties’ transaction.7 When the parties clearly define, and agree to, 
the law applicable to the merits of their arrangement, arbitrators will still “have to 
address [issues] that cannot be dealt with by simply applying the law chosen.”8 
Additionally, when the parties do not make an explicit choice on the applicable 
rules, a house’s rules will typically provide some, but not complete, clarity in guiding 
arbitrators to reach the correct decision for each proceeding.9 Given that each 
arbitral tribunal has its own rules, the resolution of a conflict of laws dispute, absent 
parties’ choice under one house, can differ from the determination of another 
house.  
This article proposes one solution to resolve the different results that emerge 
when parties do not make their choice of law explicit: arbitration houses should 
have express rules governing conflicts of laws. Since arbitration houses compete 
with each other to attract business, a single house adopting express rules to govern 
choice of law in the absence of the parties’ explicit choice could change the 
landscape of arbitration selection. A house that adopts express choice of law rules 
absent the parties’ clear instruction could draw more business than its competitors 
because it provides a crystallized standard for addressing conflicts. Moreover, 
 
named at the time of the dispute. In this, which can be called individuated arbitration, the making of all 
arrangements, including the procedures for arbitration, rests entirely with the parties concerned.”).   
 4. See Steve Nelson & Michael Robbins, Guide to International Arbitration, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 1 (Feb. 
2016), https://www.dorsey.com/-/media/files/asia-
pacific/dorseyasiaguidetointernationalarbitration.pdf?la=en (“The arbitral process itself is governed by the law 
of the place chosen as the situs or seat of arbitration, which need not be the law governing the contract in 
dispute, and by arbitral rules chosen by the parties.”). 
 5. See Eric Bergsten, Americanization of International Arbitration, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 289, 292 (2006) 
(“International commercial arbitration developed primarily on the continent of Europe, with France, Germany 
and Switzerland participating in a significant number of cross-border arbitrations.”). 
 6. See Nelson & Robbins, supra note 4, at 3 (“For example, a choice of Singapore as the seat would mean 
that the Singapore International Arbitration Act 1994 will serve as the applicable procedural law governing the 
arbitration, including provision for any limited involvement of the Singapore courts that may become necessary 
to ensure effective operation of the arbitral process.”). 
 7. See id. (“When choosing a seat, the parties must consider what ramifications will follow.”). 
 8. Linda Silberman & Franco Ferrari, Getting to the Law Applicable to the Merits in International 
Arbitration and the Consequences of Getting it Wrong, NYU LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER No. 10–40 1, 2 
(2010).   
 9. See id. (“When the parties have not chosen the law applicable to the merits, relevant arbitration laws 
and/or the arbitral rules will usually provide some direction to the arbitrators.”). 
  SAIKRISHNA SRIKANTH 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 283 
because international arbitration houses are a-national,10 these houses have 
greater flexibility than state or federal governments in crafting these express rules. 
Given that arbitration is a chaotic field where results vary based on numerous 
factors, ranging from terms of the agreement to selection of a governing house, the 
implementation of express rules to govern choice of law absent the parties’ 
directive would bring further legitimacy to arbitration houses.  
To reach this conclusion, this article proceeds in the following manner. Part I 
maps the history of international commercial arbitration in the Twentieth Century 
and the formation of competing arbitration houses. Specifically, this part looks to 
four major houses of arbitration: The International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, 
the London Court of International Arbitration, the Singapore International 
Arbitration Centre, and the American Arbitration Association. These houses have 
been selected because parties have either historically or recently favored these 
forums for international commercial arbitration. Part II briefly outlines various rules 
of these major arbitration houses that govern choice of law and examines the 
language of those houses that offer a rule for parties who do not make their choice 
of law explicit. By identifying the conflicts rules of each house, this part illuminates 
the gaps that exist when parties do not make their choice of law explicit.  
Part III fleshes out the value of having express rules governing conflicts of laws 
absent parties’ explicit choice. Sub-part A addresses previous scholarship in this 
space. Sub-part B examines the proposal to have arbitration houses adopt these 
express rules. First, two cases are scrutinized to demonstrate how arbitration 
houses rule when parties do not make their choice of law explicit. Next, the 
discussion proceeds to the normative support for adopting express rules absent 
parties’ choice, emphasizing that it will (1) increase competition between the 
arbitration houses by incentivizing other houses to adopt similar express rules, (2) 
establish a novel concept, the default house rule, which does not interfere with 
parties’ ability to contract, and (3) ensure that gaps that arise from parties not 
expressing a choice of law regarding arbitration will be filled in a way that 
strengthens private dispute resolution without undermining public policy.  
I.  A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE 
FORMATION OF FOUR MAJOR HOUSES  
International commercial arbitration arose in the early Twentieth Century despite 
the absence of two nations that play a significant role in shaping global trade: The 
United States and England.11 Although England established an international 
commercial arbitration house in 1892, the London Court of International Arbitration 
 
 10. See Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 629 (1989) (“The basic characteristic of a-national 
arbitration is that it does not owe its existence, validity, or effectiveness to a particular national law.”). 
 11. See Bergsten, supra note 5, at 291. 
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(“LCIA”)12, English law governed the substantive and procedural aspects of these 
international commercial disputes.13 The United States and England’s absence in 
the realm of arbitration prompted questions of “whether there was anything that 
could be called international commercial arbitration in the post-World War II 
period.”14 Nonetheless, a significant number of arbitrations occurred in Europe in 
the immediate post-World War II period, with parties often selecting to arbitrate 
their disputes at the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) in Paris.15  
A. The International Chamber of Commerce  
Established in 1919 in Paris, France, the ICC’s founders aimed to “create an 
organization that would represent business everywhere.”16 In 1923, four years after 
its inception, the ICC created the International Court of Arbitration and designated 
it to serve as the principal forum for arbitrating international commercial disputes.17 
For several years after its establishment, parties that submitted disputes to the ICC 
for arbitration limited their claims to matters such as the “supply of industrial plant 
and public works, sales contracts, agency distribution contracts, license 
agreements, the formation and winding-up of companies, share transactions, and 
maritime disputes.”18 These claims made up the bulk of the roughly fifty cases per 
year that the ICC arbitrated, a sizeable number for its time.19 Over time, the ICC 
Court of Arbitration’s case load grew exponentially.20 Today, the ICC Court of 
Arbitration manages the largest caseload of any arbitration house in the world that 
is involved in international commercial arbitration.21 Moreover, American parties 
 
 12. THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION REVIEW 192 (James H. Carter ed., 4th. ed. 2013). 
 13. See Bergsten, supra note 5, at 291 (“Therefore, there was English arbitration of international 
commercial disputes, not English participation in international commercial arbitration.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 292.  
 16. See History, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://iccwbo.org/about-us/who-we-are/history/ 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2019). 
 17. See id. (explaining the ICC founded the International Court of Arbitration in 1923). 
 18. Leonard N. Bannicke, International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, 23 ALTA L. REV. 51, 51 
(1985). 
 19. Bergsten, supra note 5, at 292.  
 20. L. CRAIG,  INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION (Oceana Publications & ICC Publishing 1990) 
(explaining that by 1990, the International Court of Arbitration “received 300 new requests per year, with a 
total of some 7,000 cases in its 67 years of existence.”); see also Dawn Chardonnal, ICC Announces 2017 Figures 
Confirming Global Reach and Leading Position for Complex, High-Value Disputes, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/icc-announces-2017-
figures-confirming-global-reach-leading-position-complex-high-value-disputes/ (stating that “[a]ccording to 
the latest figures, a total of 810 new cases were filed in 2017” and  “[t]he Court has administered 23,000 cases 
since its creation in 1923.”). 
 21. See Chardonnal, supra note 20; see also Craig, supra note 20, at 374. 
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are increasingly seeking out the ICC to handle their disputes through international 
commercial arbitration.22  
B. The London Court of International Arbitration  
While the ICC continued to prosper in the post-World War II era, it took time for 
America and England to warm to international commercial arbitration. As 
mentioned in Part A, the LCIA formed in 1892. However, English attitudes towards 
international commercial arbitration remained sour, largely because “arbitral 
proceedings were perceived essentially as ancillary fact-finding procedures.”23 
Moreover, the English believed that “arbitrators merely attempted to ‘play judge’ 
and could not render cogent adjudicatory determinations.”24 Nevertheless, as 
England grew to dominate world trade during the nineteenth century and 
international commercial parties increasingly looked to the London Court of 
International Arbitration to settle their disputes, Parliament passed the Arbitration 
Act of 1950 to govern international commercial arbitration.25 Parliament then 
revised the Arbitration Act in 197926 to enable “exclusion agreements”27 that, in 
effect, provide for arguably the greatest party autonomy amongst the international 
arbitration houses.28 As a result of this change, the LCIA is “no longer considered an 
exclusively English organization,”29 and remains one of the world’s leading 
international institutions for international commercial arbitrations. 
 
 22. See Bergsten, supra note 5, at 300 (noting that as of 2005, “about one-fourth of the cases heard before 
the ICC involve an American party.”). 
 23. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitration in United States Law, 40 ME. L. REV. 263, 267 
(1988). 
 24. Id.  
 25. See Richard J. Graving, The International Commercial Arbitration Institutions: How Good A Job Are They 
Doing?, 4 AM. U. J. INT’L  L. & POL’Y 319, 342–43 (1989); see also Arbitration Act 1950, 14 Geo. 6 c. 27, §§ 31-43 
(Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1950/27/pdfs/ukpga_19500027_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 
2020) (providing the governing rules for international commercial arbitration). 
 26. Arbitration Act 1979 (Commencement) Order 1979, c. 16 (Eng.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1979/750/pdfs/uksi_19790750_en.pdf. 
 27. Graving, supra note 25, at 346 (exclusion agreements mean that “now parties to international contracts 
may, unless they are all “domestic,” adopt a clause to contract out of any appeal at any time, before or after a 
dispute arises.”); see also Arbitration Act 1979, Eliz. c.42, § 3(1) (Eng.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1979/42/pdfs/ukpga_19790042_en.pdf  (detailing the statutory 
requirements for exclusion agreements). 
 28. Graving, supra note 25, at 346; see also Michael Kerr, The Arbitration Act 1979, 43 MOD. L. REV., 45 
(1980) (“[t]he Act permits the parties to contract out of any appeal by means of “exclusion agreements,” with 
the result that arbitral tribunals are then wholly unfettered in their decisions except in relation to allegations 
of “misconduct,” which remain unaffected by the Act.”). 
 29. See Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full Court Press: International Commercial Arbitration and Other 
Global Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes, 40 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1337, 1355 (2007) (explaining that by 2007, 
“more than 70 percent of the cases filed with the LCIA involve non-U.K. parties.”); see also Facts and Figures –
2017 Casework Report, LONDON CT. OF INT’L ARB. 1, 3 (last visited Apr. 8, 2019), 
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C. The American Arbitration Association  
Similar to England, the United States resisted adopting international commercial 
arbitration as a viable alternative to litigation.30 Although the United States created 
its flagship arbitration house in 1926,31 the American Arbitration Association 
(“AAA”), the United States did not fully embrace arbitration until 1970,32 when the 
United States ratified the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”).33 Before ratifying the New York 
Convention, America disfavored arbitration, treating the practice as trespassing on 
the realm of the courts.34 America only began to trek towards embracing 
international commercial arbitration when approached by international petroleum 
companies seeking to resolve their complex concession clause issues with recently 
decolonized nations.35 American law firms, while not well-versed in arbitration, had 
sizable rosters of attorneys, many of whom navigated similar issues to the ones 
facing these oil companies.36 In assisting these companies, the reality of the 
burgeoning international commercial trade scene and a desire to arbitrate instead 
of litigate became too overwhelming to ignore.  
By 1970, when the United States ratified the New York Convention, a key fixture 
in international arbitration that “applies to the recognition and enforcement of 
 
file:///Users/kellycallahan/Downloads/LCIA%20Facts%20and%20Figures%20-
%202017%20Casework%20Report.pdf (As of 2017, “The vast majority of parties (over 80%) came from outside 
the United Kingdom, with an increasingly significant number from the United States.”). 
 30. Bergsten, supra note 5, at 293 (This resistance is explained, at least in part, because “international 
commercial arbitration developed essentially as an adaptation of the civil law rules of procedure, and not those 
of the common law known in the United States and England.”).  
 31. The American Arbitration Association: A Long History of Working with Government, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA%20Government%20Services.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2020).   
 32. Carbonneau, supra note 23, at 263.  
 33. See Status of Treaties, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&clang=_en (last 
visited Mar. 06, 2020) (showing what countries have ratified the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, including the United States); see also United Nations Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 10 June 1958), NEW YORK ARBITRATION 
CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/english (last visited Mar. 06, 2020) (specifically listing the 
articles of the Convention ratifying the arbitral awards); see also Carbonneau, supra note  23, at 272 (“The New 
York Convention … is the universal charter of international commercial arbitration. Its ratification is a measure 
of a nation’s acceptance of international commercial arbitration.”). 
 34. Carbonneau, supra note 23, at 266; see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The New Litigation, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) (“Arbitration was popularly touted as a more efficient, less costly, and more final 
method for resolving disputes; there was little or no discovery, motion practice, judicial review, or other 
trappings of litigation.”). 
 35. Bergsten, supra note 5, at 293.  
 36. Id. at 294.  
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foreign arbitral awards and the referral by a court to arbitration,”37 America had 
become more accepting of international commercial arbitration.38 After ratifying 
the New York Convention, the AAA shrewdly alerted parties that they could now 
include arbitration clauses in their international contracts and ensure that the 
arbitral awards would not be upended by an American court.39 The AAA’s 
suggestion paid off because within twenty years, the United States Supreme Court 
adopted a policy “favoring international trade and commerce,” and subsequently 
steered lower federal courts “toward an unequivocal endorsement of arbitration 
for the resolution of private international commercial disputes.”40  
In 1996, the AAA established the International Centre for Dispute Resolution 
(“ICDR”) to strengthen its international presence in commercial arbitration.41 While 
concern existed for the AAA’s ability to attract completely international parties to 
the ICDR in its first ten years,42 there has been an uptick in international parties 
filing cases with the ICDR in the last few years.43 American commercial parties 
currently believe that arbitration is the “preferred method of settlement in 
international disputes.”44 
 
 37. The New York Convention, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/ (last visited Apr. 
3, 2019). 
 38. See Bergsten, supra note 5, at 295 (“In the 1970s, the United States increased trade with the Soviet 
Union and other state-trading countries. The American party was usually a private corporation that required an 
acceptable, predetermined dispute settlement mechanism. Although disputes over international trade 
contracts arose in only a small percent of the contracts, it was important for the parties to know how they 
would be settled.”).  
 39. Id.; see also Mentschikoff, supra note 3, at 856 (From its foundation, the American Arbitration 
Association “held itself out as an expert in matters that went to the enforceability of an award and set up its 
rules and regulations with the primary aim of rendering awards that would not be set aside by the courts.”).  
 40. Carbonneau, supra note 23, at 264.  
 41. See About the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the International Centre for Dispute 
Resolution (ICDR), AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/about (last visited Apr. 6, 2019) (“The AAA’s and ICDR’s 
administrative services include assisting in the appointment of mediators and arbitrators, setting hearings, and 
providing users with information on dispute resolution options, including settlement through mediation.”). 
 42. Stromberg, supra note 29, at 1354–55 (“while the AAA recently eclipsed the ICC with respect to the 
amount of international arbitration filings, most of its cases involve an American party.”) (citing Elena V. Helmer, 
International Commercial Arbitration: Americanized, “Civilized, “ or Harmonized?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
41–42 (“According to the leading authority in international arbitration, AAA’s number of truly international 
cases (cases where both parties are non-U.S.) is ‘modest’ and cannot compete with the ICC numbers.”)). 
 43. See AM. ARB. ASS’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 20 (2017) (“There were 1,026 cases 
filed with the ICDR in 2017, with total claims of $6.33 billion and counterclaims of $648 million”). 
 44. See Bergsten, supra note 5, at 300 n.35 (citing Christopher R. Drazohol, Commercial Norms, Commercial 
Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 79 (2000) (“International commercial 
arbitration is the accepted way of resolving international business disputes… [o]ne estimate is that ninety 
percent of all international contracts contain arbitration clauses.”)). 
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D. Singapore International Arbitration Centre  
While the first three arbitration houses represent longstanding forums where 
international commercial arbitration has thrived, new players have emerged on the 
scene.45 In 1991, Singapore entered the international commercial arbitration space 
by establishing the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”).46 
Commercial parties attribute SIAC’s popularity for international arbitration in part 
to “an efficient and impartial judiciary respectful of the principles of arbitration.”47 
The ICC endorsed this view by noting in 2016 that Singapore represented the most 
popular seat in Asia for ICC arbitration.48 By 2018, Singapore had become the third 
most popular international commercial arbitration seat in the world.49 Currently, 
“eighty percent of SIAC’s caseload is international in nature, while forty-two percent 
of the new cases filed in 2016 did not involve Singaporean parties.”50  
II.  CHOOSING THE APPLICABLE LAW – A GLANCE AT THE CHOICE OF LAW 
OFFERINGS IN THE FOUR ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS  
The popularity of the four aforementioned arbitration houses stems as much from 
their commitment to enforcing arbitral awards as their flexibility in allowing parties 
in international commercial arbitration to choose the law applicable to their 
arrangement. This section examines the extent to which each forum offers parties 
alternatives in the arbitration process.  
A. The ICC  
The ICC’s Arbitration Rules, last updated on March 1, 2017, “regulate the 
management of cases” submitted to the ICC’s International Court of Arbitration.51 
For the ICC, parties should refer to four specific articles under the Arbitral 
Proceedings heading, namely: Article 18 – Place of the Arbitration (Article 18(1) 
states that “[t]he place of the arbitration shall be fixed by the Court, unless agreed 
upon by the parties.” Article 18(2) states that “[t]he arbitral tribunal may, after 
consultation with the parties, conduct hearings and meetings at any location it 
 
 45. See generally CHINA INT’L ECON. TRADE ARB. COMM’N H.K. ARB. CTR., 
http://www.cietachk.org/portal/showIndexPage.do?pagePath=%5Cen_US%5Cindex&userLocale=en_US (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2020); H.K. INT’L. ARB. CTR., https://www.hkiac.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020); CHARTERED INST. 
OF ARB., https://www.ciarb.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
 46. See Why SIAC, SING. INT’L ARB. CTR., http://www.siac.org.sg/2014-11-03-13-33-43/why-siac. 
 47. See THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION REVIEW 419 (James H. Carter ed., 9th ed. 2018). 
 48. See Christopher K. Tahbaz & Justin R. Rassi, The Development of Arbitral Institutions in Asia, 13 U. PA. 
ASIAN L. REV. 102, 104 (2018) (citing 2016 ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics, 2017 ICC DISP. RES. BULL. at 111). 
 49. THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION REVIEW, supra note 47, at 419 (citing WHITE & CASE LLP ET AL., 2018 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2018). 
 50. See Why SIAC, supra note 46. 
 51. International Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Arbitration Rules (Mar. 1, 2017). 
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considers appropriate, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.”),52 Article 19 – 
Rules Governing the Proceeding (“The proceedings before the arbitral tribunal shall 
be governed by the Rules and, where the Rules are silent, by any rules which the 
parties or, failing them, the arbitral tribunal may settle on, whether or not reference 
is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law to be applied to the 
arbitration.”),53 Article 20 – Language of the Arbitration (“In the absence of an 
agreement by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the language or 
languages of the arbitration, due regard being given to all relevant circumstances, 
including the language of the contract.”),54 and Article 21 – Applicable Rules of Law 
(Article 21(1) states that “[t]he parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law 
to be applied by the arbitral tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of 
any such agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it 
determines to be appropriate.”; Article 21(3) states “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall 
assume the powers of an amiable compositeur or decide ex aequo et bono only if 
the parties have agreed to give it such powers.”).55  
The ICC states that these rules “ensure transparency, efficiency and fairness in 
the dispute resolution process while allowing parties to exercise their choice over 
many aspects of the procedure.”56 Fundamentally, the ICC designed the rules so 
that they “balance party autonomy with professional supervision of proceedings.”57  
B. The LCIA  
While the London Court of International Arbitration has touted the autonomy it 
provides to commercial parties, the rules governing the LCIA do not offer as much 
choice for parties as suggested. The LCIA Arbitration Rules are current as of October 
1, 2014.58 In that most recent update, the mention of party choice appears in two 
articles of the LCIA Arbitration Rules: Article 16 – Seat(s) of Arbitration and Place(s) 
of Hearing (Article 16.2 states that “[t]he parties may agree in writing the seat (or 
legal place) of their arbitration at any time before the formation of the Arbitral 
Tribunal and, after such formation, with the prior written consent of the Arbitral 
Tribunal.”; Article 16.2 further states “ [i]n default of any such agreement, the seat 
of the arbitration shall be London (England), unless and until the Arbitral Tribunal 
orders, in view of the circumstances and after having given the parties a reasonable 
opportunity to make written comments to the Arbitral Tribunal, that another 
 
 52. See id. at art. 18(1)–18(2). 
 53. See id. at art. 19. 
 54. See id. at art. 20. 
 55. See id. at art. 21(1). 
 56. International Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Arbitration Rules - Mediation Rules, 2 (2017). 
 57. Graving, supra note 25, at 332.  
 58. See London Court of International Arbitration [LCIA], LCIA Arbitration Rules (Oct. 1, 2014). 
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arbitral seat is more appropriate.”),59 and Article 22 – Additional Powers of the 
Arbitral Tribunal (“The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the parties’ dispute in 
accordance with the law(s) or rules of law chosen by the parties as applicable to the 
merits of their dispute. If and to the extent that the Arbitral Tribunal decides that 
the parties have made no such choice, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the law(s) or 
rules of law which it considers appropriate.”).60 Moreover, Article 16.1 and 16.2 
raised concerns regarding party choice.  
While the 1998 Rules instructed the LCIA Court to make a final determination on 
the location of the arbitral seat absent the parties’ choice (which often defaulted to 
London), the 2014 Rules bequeathed that power to the arbitral tribunal instead.61 
Specifically, while the 2014 update indicates that parties retain some measure of 
choice to select the seat “even after the arbitral tribunal has been constituted,” the 
notion that party autonomy exists in this regard is upended by the tribunal’s ability 
“to fix a different seat than the parties have agreed, to the extent such agreement 
takes place after constitution of the tribunal.”62  
C. The AAA  
As referenced in Part I, the major bulk of the AAA’s international commercial 
arbitration occurs under the International Court of Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”). 
Two articles discuss the ramifications for parties when they do not come to an 
agreement or make their choice explicit: Article 17 – Place of Arbitration (“If the 
parties do not agree on the place of arbitration by a date established by the 
Administrator, the Administrator may initially determine the place of arbitration, 
subject to the power of the arbitral tribunal to determine finally the place of 
arbitration within 45 days after its constitution.”),63 and Article 18 – Language of 
Arbitration (“If the parties have not agreed otherwise, the language(s) of the 
arbitration shall be the language(s) of the documents containing the arbitration 
agreement, subject to the power of the arbitral tribunal to determine 
otherwise.”).64 Additionally, Article 31 – Applicable Laws and Remedies (“The 
arbitral tribunal shall apply the substantive law(s) or rules of law agreed by the 
parties as applicable to the dispute. Failing such an agreement by the parties, the 
tribunal shall apply such law(s) or rules of law as it determines to be 
 
 59. See id. at art. 16.1–16.2. 
 60. See id. at art. 22.3. 
 61. See Ferdinando Emanuele & Milo Molfa, The Application of the 2014 LCIA Rules to Arbitral Proceedings 
Seated in Italy, 8 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN ARB. REV. 77, 78 (2015). 
 62. Id. at 78–79. 
 63. See Int’l Ctr. for Disp. Resol. [ICDR], International Dispute Resolution Procedures, art. 17(1) (June 1, 
2014). 
 64. See id. at art. 18 
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appropriate.”),65 enables the tribunal to apply the substantive law on behalf of the 
parties if they do not agree on the law beforehand.  
D. The SIAC 
Similar to its counterparts, the Singapore International Arbitration Center details 
what it will do when parties make an explicit choice on both the language and 
location of the arbitration. These rules are current as of August 1, 2016. The SIAC 
elucidates these specificities in Rule 21 – Seat of the Arbitration (“The parties may 
agree on the seat of the arbitration. Failing such an agreement, the seat of the 
arbitration shall be determined by the Tribunal, having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case.”),66 and Rule 22 – Language of the Arbitration (“Unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall determine the language to be 
used in the arbitration.”).67  
The above rules show that even the best arbitration houses have rules governing 
parties when they do not make an explicit choice. However, the existing framework 
is inadequate to address the conflict of laws/choice-of-law issues that may arise 
when parties fail to make their choice. To improve the current rules and to rekindle 
the belief that arbitration places power squarely in the hands of the parties, a 
further step must be taken to bridge the gap when parties do not make their choice 
clear and choice-of-law issues are implicated. A viable solution involves establishing 
express rules governing conflicts of law when parties do not make a definitive 
choice.  
III.  IMPLEMENTING EXPRESS RULES GOVERNING CONFLICTS OF LAW ABSENT THE 
PARTIES’ CHOICE 
A. How Scholarship Has Tackled the Conflicts Question in Absence of the 
Parties Explicit Choice  
The determination by arbitral tribunals of what the applicable law should be when 
parties do not make a choice is not a new phenomenon. Under the most recent 
version of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”), the UNCITRAL Model law “directs the arbitral tribunal to use a 
conflict of laws analysis to determine the applicable law,” which may include a “duty 
to apply the conflict of laws rules that it deems applicable or appropriate.”68 
 
 65. See id. at art. 31. 
 66. See Sing. Int’l Arb. Ctr. [SIAC], SIAC Rules, Rule 21.1 (Aug. 1, 2016). 
 67. See id. Rule 22.1. 
 68. Silberman & Ferrari, supra note 8, at 4 n.37 (quoting United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Art. 28(2) (1985) (“Failing any 
designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules 
which it considers applicable.”)). 
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Contrastingly, the New York Convention does not offer any guidance as to the law 
applicable absent parties’ choice.69 The LCIA Rules are in concert with the English 
Arbitration Act of 1996, as both adhere to the idea that when the parties do not 
make their choice of applicable law clear, the tribunal applies the conflict of laws 
rules it deems appropriate.70  
The options that arbitral tribunals have in streamlining how they want to apply 
the conflicts of laws rules is noted by the variety of choices arbitral tribunals can 
make. One scholar has suggested that arbitrators should, absent an arbitration 
clause, apply the conflict of laws system of the courts of the country that would 
retain jurisdiction over the matter.71 Another approach involves looking to the rules 
of the arbitral seat regarding conflicts of laws.72 Section 6 of the International 
Commercial Arbitration Act (“ICAA”) and Article 28(2) of the Model Law bolster the 
former point by stating “[i]f the parties have agreed to arbitrate their dispute, but 
did not, in a commercial agreement or at the time that the dispute arose, agree on 
the law to apply to the agreement and the dispute, then that law is determined by 
the arbitral tribunal.”73 A suggestion also exists for utilizing the conflicts of laws 
system of the nation where the arbitral award will be enforced.74 A completely 
different proposal involves applying the conflict of laws system of the country most 
closely connected with the dispute.75  
The most recent scholarship contends that “it is fair to say to parties that they 
cannot rely too heavily on a particular law being applied when they choose 
arbitration and do not make an explicit choice about applicable law.”76 However, in 
that same breath, this scholarship argues that “parties should be able to have some 
control with respect to the choice of law process and to ensure that arbitrators do 
what the parties want them to do.”77 To overcome this challenge, parties must 
 
 69. Id. at 5.  
 70. See PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 
JURISDICTIONS 334 (3rd ed. 2010); 
see also United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, Art. 28(2) (1985). 
 71. See Carlo Croff, The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a Conflicts of 
Laws Problem?, 16 INT’L LAW. 613, 615 (1982). 
 72. See F.A. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, 2 ARB. INT’L 157, 167 (1967); see also Filip De Ly, The Place of 
Arbitration in the Conflict of Laws of International Commercial Arbitration: An Exercise in Arbitration Planning, 
12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 48, 53 (1991) (“Under the conflict of laws perspective, the question arises whether and 
to what extent the place of arbitration may, in major arbitration jurisdictions, be considered a relevant 
connecting point with respect to international commercial arbitrations.”). 
 73. See Section 6 of the ICAA; see also UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, art. 28(2) (1985). 
 74. Silberman & Ferrari, supra note 8, at 15. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 32. 
 77. Id. 
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make express choice of law clauses matter so that in circumstances where 
arbitrators fail to honor the parties’ choice by instead applying commercial law or 
other legal principles, the action is considered beyond the scope of the arbitrator’s 
authority.78 In effect, the absence of party choice in international commercial 
arbitration is better served by emphasizing the importance of making an express 
choice.  
But what if a better answer existed to ensure that the lack of explicit choice by 
the parties did not manifest in confused arbitrators who inconsistently applied 
conflicts of law analysis? Perhaps an answer that would seek to bring uniformity to 
the growing issue of how best to retain party autonomy in selecting the applicable 
law without the arbitral institutions imposing the selection on parties and 
undercutting their autonomy. The solution I offer is that arbitration houses should 
adopt express rules governing conflicts of law when parties do not make an explicit 
choice on the applicable law.  
B. Why Express Rules Governing Conflicts of Law Absent Explicit Choice by 
the Parties Strengthens International Commercial Arbitration  
The primary reason arbitration houses should implement express rules to govern 
conflicts of law absent explicit choice by the parties is stability. The unpredictability 
of arbitration results is largely due to the absence of definite statements on choice 
of law.79 In this chaos, the rules that arbitration houses adopt to govern conflicts of 
laws must be consistent and predictable to ensure uniformity.80 Achieving 
consistency is critical because courts assess the decisions of arbitration houses and 
subsequently establish a body of caselaw that they can refer to for future 
decisions.81 However, given the absence of rules governing conflicts of law when 
parties do not make an explicit choice, arbitration houses can render decisions that 
clarify the standard for determining the governing law in one instance, and then 
subsequently modify the standard in the next instance. Two cases below will 
illuminate this problem.    
 
 78. Id. at 32.  
 79. See Craig M. Gertz, The Selection of Choice of Law Provisions in International Commercial Arbitration: 
A Case for Contractual Depeçage, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 163, 177 (1991) (“Without the benefit of clear, definite 
statements of the law, arbitrators essentially apply such choices of law by determining de novo what the rules 
require for each separate dispute. The results of arbitration thus become unpredictable, eradicating the 
outcome-determinative and the dispute reducing qualities of choice of law.”). 
 80. See S.I. STRONG, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES 21 (2012). 
 81. Id. (quoting Interim Award in ICC Case No. 4131, IX Y.B. Com. Arb. 131, 135 (1984)) (“[t]he decisions of 
these tribunals progressively create caselaw which should be taken into account, because it draws conclusions 
from economic reality and conforms to the needs of international commerce, to which rules specific to 
international arbitration, themselves successively elaborated should respond.”). 
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1. Case Law  
a. SulAmérica SA v. Enesa Engenharia SA 
In SulAmérica Cia Nacional de Seguros SA v. Enesa Engenharia SA (“SulAmérica”),82 
the Court of Appeal of England and Wales examined an arbitration agreement 
regarding an insurance policy.83 Under the policy, the insurers refused to cover 
damages and consequential losses greater than 1 billion Reais resulting from revolts 
that temporarily stopped construction of the Jirau hydropower plant.84 Prior to 
arbitration, the parties made an express choice of law that Brazilian law would 
“govern the contract.”85 Additionally, the parties agreed to an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause to be controlled by the Brazilian courts.86 However, the parties also placed a 
multi-layered dispute resolution clause in the policy that established London as the 
seat of arbitration and mediation.87  
Before the English Court of Appeal decision, the insurers filed suit against the 
insured in the 9th Civil Court of the Capital of Sao Paulo.88 The insurers argued that 
since they crafted the policy as an adhesion contract, the efficacy of the arbitration 
agreement remained suspect.89 Additionally, under Article 4 of the Brazilian 
Arbitration Act, the parties did not expressly consent on the arbitration house.90 A 
Brazilian Civil Court judge dismissed the anti-arbitration request made by the 
insureds,91 but a week later, another civil court judge upheld the anti-arbitration 
request.92 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of the State Sao Paulo upheld the anti-
arbitration request.93 The Court of Appeals rested its reasoning on the 
ineffectiveness of the arbitration agreement under Brazilian law, pursuant to 
adhesion contract rules.94  
 
 82. Sulamérica Cia Nacional de Seguros S.A. v. Enesa Engenharia S.A. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 638, [2013] WLR 
102 (Eng.). 
 83. Id. at ¶ 1. 
 84. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 85. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.  
 88. TJSP AI No. 0304979-49.2011.26.0000, Relator Paulo Alcides, 19.4.2012, DIÁRIO OFCIAL DOS ESTADOS SÃO 
PAULO [D.O.E.S.P.], 19.4.2012 (Braz.). 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. (“On December 12, 2011, in an ex parte decision, the first instance Brazilian judge dismissed the 
interim anti-arbitration request made by the insureds.”). 
 92. Id. (“On December 19, 2011, a second decision by the Brazilian judge reviewed the insureds’ request 
and granted an anti-arbitration injunction against the insurers.”). 
 93. TJSP AI No. 0304979-49.2011.26.0000, Relator Paulo Alcides, 19.4.2012, DIÁRIO OFCIAL DOS ESTADOS SÃO 
PAULO [D.O.E.S.P.], 19.4.2012 (Braz.). 
 94. Id.  
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However, in England, the Court of Appeal came to a different result. The Court 
of Appeal fashioned a three-part test to determine the relevant law: (1) the express 
choice of the parties, (2) the implied choice of the parties in the absence of an 
express choice, and (3) where the parties had not made any choice, the proper law 
would be the law which the arbitration agreement has its closest or most real 
connection with.95 Since the parties did not adopt an express choice of law provision 
to govern the arbitration agreement, the Court of Appeal examined the implied 
choice of the parties and the closest/most real connection prong, inquiries which 
the Court admitted “will often merge into one another.”96 The Court of Appeal 
started their analysis at this point because the parties likely intended for the 
entirety of this relationship to be governed by the same system of laws, unless 
indications to the contrary appeared.97  
While the Court of Appeal noted that the parties chose Brazilian law to govern 
the policy, that the exclusive jurisdiction clause would be controlled by Brazilian 
law, and that the contract itself had a close commercial connection to Brazil, the 
Court found the parties’ implied choice to be English law and that English law had 
the closest connection for the arbitration agreement.98 The enforceability of the 
arbitration agreement under Brazilian law depended on Ensena’s consent, which 
would “undermine the agreement.”99 Moreover, the Court of Appeal stated that 
the substantive law governing the insurance policy did not bear a relationship to 
that of dispute resolution, while the exclusive jurisdiction clause maintained a 
closer connection to the arbitration agreement.100 By choosing London as their seat 
of arbitration, the Court said that the parties accepted that “the law of the country 
relating to the conduct and supervision of arbitrations will apply to the 
proceedings.”101  
The Court of Appeal held that “it is probably fair to start from the assumption 
that, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, the parties intended the 
whole of their relationship to be governed by the same system of law.”102 
 
 95. Joanne Greenaway, SulAmerica v. Enesa Engenharia: Herbert Smith comment, THOMPSON REUTERS: U.K. 
PRAC. L. (May 31, 2012). 
 96. Id.  
 97. Sulamérica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A. v. Enesa Engenharisa S.A. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 638, [11], [2013] 
1 WLR 102 (Eng.). 
 98. Greenaway, supra note 95, at 1. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. (“Following the approach taken in ACE ltd v CMS Energy Corporation [2009] 1 LRIR 414, the court 
did not allow the exclusive jurisdiction clause to encroach on the validity of the parties’ choice to arbitrate 
although it left little in practice to court jurisdiction (which was limited to declaring a dispute arbitrable, 
compelling arbitration, declaring the validity of the award, or deciding on the merits if the parties dispense with 
arbitration).”). 
 101. Sulamérica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A. v. Enesa Engenharisa S.A. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 638, [29], [2013] 
1 WLR 102 (Eng.). 
 102. Id. at ¶ 11. 
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Furthermore, the Court of Appeal specified that while “it is common for parties to 
make an express choice of law to govern their contract, but unusual for them to 
make an express choice of the law to govern any arbitration agreement contained 
within it,” if the parties have not done so, “the natural inference is that they 
intended the proper law chosen to govern the substantive contract also to govern 
the agreement to arbitrate.”103 
The three part-inquiry implemented by the Court of Appeal in SulAmérica 
became the leading authority on determining the law governing an arbitration 
agreement. Before SulAmérica, English cases had been split in determining whether 
arbitration agreements should be governed by the substantive law of the contract 
or by the seat chosen by the parties.104 After the case, parties gained clarity on 
which law English courts would apply to arbitration agreement when the choice of 
law is not explicit.105 Although courts in other countries evaluating arbitration 
agreements absent the parties’ express choice of law looked to SulAmérica for 
guidance, application of the three-part test could still yield unpredictable results.106 
Therefore, parties involved in international arbitration are better served when they 
expressly include a governing law clause in the arbitration agreement.107  
 
 103. Id.  
 104. See Abuja International Hotels Ltd. v. Meridien SAS [2012] EWHC (Comm) 87, [20, 21], [2012] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 461 (Hamblen J) (Eng.) (finding that English law applied to the arbitration of a management agreement 
governed by Nigeran law because under the closest connection test, the law under which the arbitration had 
its closest connection was England, given that the parties agreed that England was the arbitral seat); see also C 
v. D [2007] EWCA (Civ) 1282, [13], (Eng.) (administering the closest connection test [meaning, closest 
connection to the arbitral seat] to a London arbitration clause in a contract that the parties expressly instructed 
New York law to govern). 
 105. See Arsanovia Ltd. v. Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings [2012] EWHC (Comm) 3702 [23], [2013] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 235 (Smith J) (Eng.) (finding that the terms of the arbitration agreement, which excluded parts of the Indian 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996, demonstrated a mutual intention of the parties to choose the law of 
India as the law of the arbitration agreement); see also Habas Sinai ve Tibbi Gazler Istihsal Endustrisi as v. VSC 
Steel Company Ltd. [2013] EWHC (Comm) 4071 [101] (Eng.) (explaining that SulAmerica advised that deciding 
on an arbitral seat carries significant weight, particularly absent a clear expression of substantive law in the 
main contract; however, if substantive law is expressed in the main contract, it is a strong signal regarding 
parties’ intention as to the correct law governing the arbitration agreement, perhaps even to the point that 
agreed-upon choices about the proper arbitral seat are insufficient to supersede an express choice of 
substantive governing law).  
 106. See Harry Ormsby, Governing Law of the Arbitration Agreement: Importance of SulAmérica Case 
Reaffirmed Where Choice of Seat was Agreed Without Actual Authority, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2014/01/29/governing-law-of-the-arbitration-agreement-
importance-of-sulamerica-case-reaffirmed-where-choice-of-seat-was-agreed-without-actual-authority/ (“It 
will depend on whether there is an express choice of law of the matrix contract; whether there is a choice of 
seat in the arbitration agreement (and whether this is different to the express choice of law of the matrix 
contract), and whether there are any other “sufficient factors” which may displace an attempt to imply a choice 
of law on the basis of the chosen seat and lead to application of the third stage (the “closest connection” test).”). 
 107. Id.  
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b. Firstlink Investment Corp. Ltd v. GT Payment Pte Ltd. and others 
In Firstlink Investment Corp. Ltd v. GT Payment Pte Ltd. and others,108 the question 
before the Singapore High Court centered on how to determine which law governs 
an international arbitration agreement as impliedly chosen by the parties in the 
absence of express choice.109  The contention between the three defendants and 
the plaintiff revolved around a perceived violation of an online user agreement.110 
The plaintiff argued that the money deposited to an online account constituted a 
loan to the defendants.111 When plaintiff sued, one defendant applied for a stay and 
referenced the arbitration agreement the parties signed, stating that claims were 
to be adjudicated by the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (“SCC”).112 The plaintiff asserted that the arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable as “it does not make sense” for an agreement to be governed by the 
“laws” of an international arbitral institute such as the SCC.”113 The defendant 
countered that the parties chose the substantive law to “govern the main contract 
and not the arbitration agreement.”114  
The Singapore High Court referenced SulAmérica and implemented the three-
part test to determine the applicable law absent the parties’ explicit choice.115 The 
Court noted that each part of the test must be examined separately to ensure that 
any choice made by the parties is respected.116 The Court also stated that the 
methodology employed in SulAmérica mirrored the test used by the Singapore 
Court of Appeal to determine the substantive law governing commercial 
contracts.117 
 
 108. FirstLink Investments Corp. Ltd. v GT Payment Pte Ltd. and others [2014] SGHCR 12.  
 109. Id. at ¶ 1. 
 110. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at ¶ 10. 
 113. FirstLink Invs. Corp. v. GT Payment Pte., [2014] SGHCR 12 ¶ 10 (Sing.). 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at ¶ 11. 
 116. Id. See also Greenaway, supra note 95, at 2 (“This tracks the development of the principle of 
separability, whereby the arbitration agreement is legally distinct from the contract of which it forms a part.”); 
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law of Int’l Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (July 7, 2006). 
 117. FirstLink Invs. Corp. v. GT Payment Pte., [2014] SGHCR 12 ¶ 16 (Sing.) (citing Pacific Recreation Pte. Ltd. 
V. S.Y. Technology, Inc., [2008] 2 SLR(R) 491 ¶ 36 (“There are three stages in determining the governing law of 
a contract. The first stage is to examine the contract itself to determine whether it states expressly what the 
governing law should be. In the absence of an express provision one moves to the second stage which is to see 
whether the intention of the parties as to the governing law can be inferred from the circumstances. If this 
cannot be done, the third stage is to determine with which system of law the contract has its most close and 
real connection.”)) (citing JIO Minerals FZC v. Mineral Enterprises Ltd., [2011] 1 SLR 391 ¶ 79 (“It is well 
established that a three-stage approach is applied to determine the governing law of a contract … At the first 
stage, the court considers if the contract expressly states its governing law (“the Express Law”). If the contract 
is silent, the court proceeds to the second stage and considers whether it can infer the governing law from the 
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Ultimately though, the Singapore High Court noted that part two of the 
SulAmérica test needs refining because the English Court of Appeal “created a 
rebuttable presumption that the express substantive law of the contract would be 
taken as the parties’ implied choice of the proper law governing the arbitration 
agreement.”118 To avoid that presumption, the Singapore High Court instead stated 
that “it cannot always be assumed that commercial parties want the same system 
of law to govern their relationship of performing the substantive obligations under 
the contract, and the quite separate (and often unhappy) relationship of resolving 
disputes when problems arise.”119 Thus, the natural inference that parties want the 
same system of laws to govern two separate relationships cannot exist.120 
Instead of adopting the natural inference that the English Court of Appeal posits 
in SulAmérica, the Singapore High Court stressed that when parties seek to resolve 
their disagreements through dispute resolution, the parties should opt for 
neutrality principles.121 The High Court further observed that the most important of 
neutrality principles is allowing the law of the arbitral seat to recognize and enforce 
the arbitration agreement.122  By selecting a neutral seat, the parties would have 
“implicitly selected the lex arbitri of the seat to govern matters including the 
supervisory court’s powers to determine a jurisdictional dispute in relation to the 
validity of an arbitration agreement.”123 Furthermore, because the parties’ choice 
of a neutral seat incorporates a selection of the arbitral seat to preside over 
procedural aspects of the arbitration (i.e. the determination of a jurisdictional 
dispute by a supervisory court with respect to the enforceability of an arbitration 
agreement), it is logical that parties intended the same system of law to govern the 
validity of the arbitration agreement in order to ensure consistency between the 
law and procedure of determining the legitimacy of the arbitration agreement.124 
In Firstlink, the Singapore High Court makes a compelling case for the arbitral 
seat to govern the validity of the arbitration agreement in the absence of express 
choice by the parties.125 The Singapore High Court’s decision puts a premium on 
 
intentions of the parties (“the Implied Law”). If the court is unable to infer the parties’ intentions, it moves to 
the third stage and determines the law which has the closest and most real connection with the contract (“the 
Objective Law”).”).  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at ¶ 13. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. See Singapore High Court Finds that Parties are Presumed to have Chosen the Law of the Seat as the 
Proper Law of the Arbitration Agreement, CLIFFORD CHANCE at 2 (June 2014), 
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2014/06/singapore-high-court-finds-
that-parties-are-presumed-to-have-chosen-the-law-of-the-seat-as-the-proper-law-of-the-arbitra.pdf. 
 123. FirstLink Invs. Corp. v. GT Payment Pte., [2014] SGHCR 12 ¶ 15 (Sing.). 
 124. Id.  
 125. See supra note 122, at 3.  
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ensuring neutrality and integrity for the arbitration process.126 By applying the law 
of the arbitral seat instead of the substantive law of the underlying contract, the 
Singapore High Court sends a clear message that the law of the seat is more aligned 
with the commercial intention of the parties.127  
Both SulAmérica and Firstlink lay out a framework for what rules govern an 
arbitration agreement when parties do not make their choice of law explicit. 
However, while the rule set forth in SulAmérica can be referred to as a leading 
authority, the rule established in Firstlink reveals that even the leading authority 
can be altered within a short period of time based on the nature of the case.128 
Given that arbitration houses adopt different rules to govern the agreement when 
the parties do not make an explicit choice of law, houses should adopt a system 
where the rules governing conflicts does not change on a case-by-case basis. Such 
a move would establish a consistent framework that parties can refer to when 
crafting their arbitration agreements. Moreover, it would facilitate more business 
for an arbitration house that implements this system, increasing jurisdictional 
competition.  
2. Jurisdictional Competition: Establishing House Rules Absent Party 
Choice to Increase Caseload 
International arbitration houses specialize in attracting clients to conduct business 
in their house instead of another’s.129 Increased competition between arbitration 
houses can stem from a change as simple, but important, as introducing specialized 
commercial courts that “bring international dispute resolution ‘business’ back to 
the domestic courts.”130 The race to secure arbitration cases exploded over the 
course of the last few decades.131 The reason for this boom is that jurisdictions 
realized that having laws that provide parties with greater autonomy to arbitrate 
 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Greenaway, supra note  95, at 2 (“[A]lthough we now have clearer guidance as to the law which English 
courts will apply to the arbitration agreement where it is not stipulated, there is still room for uncertainty and 
much will depend on the circumstances of the case.”). See also FirstLink Invs. Corp. v. GT Payment Pte., [2014] 
SGHCR 12 ¶ 16 (Sing.) (“Nevertheless, I must caution that the determination of the implied proper law 
ultimately remains a question of construction; each case will have to turn on its own facts.”). 
 129. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Diversity and Uniformity in International Arbitration Law, 31 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 393, 411 (2017) (“Competition among jurisdictions for arbitration business provides the incentive for this 
sort of [legal] innovation in international arbitration law.”). 
 130. See Alison Chamberlain, Destination Arbitration: Competition in the Market for Justice, THOMPSON 
REUTERS: PRAC. L. ARB. BLOG (Mar. 21, 2019), http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/destination-arbitration-
competition-in-the-market-for-justice/. 
 131. See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 92 (2009) (“The caseload of the American 
Arbitration Association, which is now chosen in more than 10 percent of international contracts utilizing 
arbitration, more than tripled from 1993 to 2003.”). 
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their private agreements would indubitably receive more commerce.132 Moreover, 
jurisdictions began to understand that the entity that fashioned a rule governing a 
financial transaction, be it a state, a foreign nation, or a private organization, 
mattered less as long as private, consenting parties had greater autonomy “to make 
welfare-enhancing transactions.”133 
In the same way that private parties being able to “opt out of mandatory 
domestic laws through offshore incorporation mirrors ‘legal regime shopping,’”134 
parties should have the ability to regime shop for arbitration houses that clearly 
elucidate rules governing an arbitration agreement when the parties do not make 
their choice of law explicit.135 Take the example of the three-part inquiry established 
by the Court of Appeal in SulAmérica. If parties do not make an explicit choice about 
the law to govern their London arbitration clause, SulAmérica states that the test 
goes to implied choice/closest connection. However, SulAmérica also says that 
individual cases must be evaluated on a case by case basis. So, the question 
remains, is the implied choice/closest connection test reserved only for cases where 
the facts are similar to SulAmérica? This unpredictability is reason enough for 
parties to ask that arbitration houses adopt express rules governing choice of law 
when the parties do not make a choice.  
International commercial arbitration is trending towards homogeneity as 
competition increases between longtime arbitration strongholds and regional 
arbitral seats.136 The gap between these houses is shrinking when it comes to cost, 
delay, sophistication, reliability, consistency, and efficacy.137 If homogeneity is 
inevitable, then adopting express rules on conflicts of laws absent party choice will 
be one way to continue to bolster jurisdictional competition.  
 
 132. Id. at 86–87 (“Since the mid-1980s, arbitration has emerged as an important dispute resolution tool 
for international commerce. . . . Contracting parties have significant freedom to choose between one or more 
court systems and arbitration. If the parties agree to resolve their disputes with binding arbitration, nations 
with significant international trade and investment activity commonly will enforce the arbitration clause and 
the subsequent arbitration award.”). 
 133. See William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1, 42 (2019). 
 134. Id. at 43. 
 135. See Erin A. O’Hara & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration, The Law Market, and The Law of Lawyering, 38 
INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 87, 90 (2014) (If, as a practical matter, several jurisdictions, both within the United States 
and abroad, have deliberately liberalized their home legal regimes, including their lawyer licensing rules, in 
order to market themselves as more “arbitration friendly,” then surely the same concept could apply to 
arbitration houses liberalizing their rules to adopt a new system that makes explicit the rules governing 
arbitration agreements absent express choice by the parties.). 
 136. See Kimberly Chen Nobles, Emerging Issues and Trends in International Arbitration, 43 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
77, 107 (2012). 
 137. Id. at 108. 
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3. The House Default Rule: Safeguarding Privately Created Rights by 
Solidifying Arbitral Rules Governing Conflicts of Law Absent Party 
Choice   
While increasing competition between arbitral tribunals undoubtedly challenges 
houses to adopt express rules governing conflicts of laws absent party choice, 
parties may be concerned if the house is best suited to determine default rules138 
when the parties either intentionally or unintentionally fail to make it clear in their 
agreement. Since “arbitration is a creature of contract,”139 the “disputes go to 
arbitration only with the consent of all parties to the dispute.”140 Moreover, in 
international commercial arbitration, a fundamental principle regarding conflicts of 
law that has emerged is the arbitrators duty to respect the rights of the parties to 
identify the applicable law governing their agreement.141 Therefore, critics of the 
proposal set forth here may say that unless significant public policy considerations 
exist,142 arbitration houses should not interfere on the parties’ right to choose 
which law governs their agreement, even if that choice includes not making a call 
on a potential conflicts of law issue.  
Although party autonomy reigns supreme in arbitration, the reason parties 
choose a specific arbitral house is that they believe that tribunal can best preside 
over their agreement.143 In making that decision, parties are aware of the rules that 
each arbitration house has implemented. Because default rules can be opted out of 
by the parties through their contract, parties might resist allowing arbitrators to 
impose a house default rule onto them. However, if arbitration houses adopt 
express rules to govern conflicts of law absent party choice, the house is simply 
 
 138. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 703, 706 (1999) (“Default rules are those government-created rights and duties that are 
privatizable, rules that govern unless the parties contract out of them.”). 
 139. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (“arbitration is a matter of 
contract”); Sgouros v. Transunion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 2016) (“As the Supreme Court repeatedly 
has emphasized, arbitration is a creature of contract.”); First Liberty Inv. Group v. Nicholsberg, 145 F.3d 647, 
649 (3rd Cir. 1998) (“Arbitration is a creature of contract.”). 
 140. Ware, supra note 138, at 708–09. 
 141. See Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice of Law in Commercial Arbitration, 
79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 59 (2005) (“‘The right of the parties to themselves identify the law to apply and the 
obligation on arbitrators to respect that choice is the one overwhelming and truly international conflict of laws 
rule which [sic] has developed in international commercial arbitration.’” (quoting JULIAN D.M. LEW, APPLICABLE 
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 582 (1978))). 
 142. Id. at 70 (“Arbitrators do, however, have a duty to render an award that is enforceable. If the arbitrators 
render an award that is contrary to the public policy of the forum or of the place of enforcement, the award 
may be unenforceable, leaving the prevailing party without an adequate remedy.”). 
 143. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and 
the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2856 (2015) (“Negotiating parties could design their own idiosyncratic 
procedures, select their decision makers, and stipulate remedies to suit their preferences. Arbitrators in turn 
derived their power from and owed their loyalties to the parties’ intent, rather than governing law.”). 
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alerting parties that by choosing a particular tribunal, parties can still contract 
around all the other default rules of the contract except the house default rule that 
governs conflicts of law when party choice is not made clear.  
While the new house default rule may be seen as too burdensome and an 
overplay by arbitration houses against the strong history of allowing parties to 
decide what they want to contract around, the truth is that “in theory, the law 
governing arbitration should supply the default provisions necessary to fill any 
gaps.”144 In adopting this express rule, arbitration houses would effectively 
communicate to parties that if they do not make their choice of law clear to govern 
conflicts, the house has established a rule to remedy the issue. Similar to how 
“courts may need to require parties to announce at the outset of arbitration 
whether they are asserting any claims arising under mandatory law,”145 so that it 
would “alert other parties to the risk of a motion to vacate for failure to apply the 
law and to the need for a record of the arbitration proceedings,”146 the arbitration 
house would simply alert parties to the fact that by choosing this seat, an embedded 
house rule controls in the absence of party choice with respect to conflicts of law. 
In this sense, the arbitration house is forewarning parties that the tribunal already 
has a rule on the books to govern conflicts of law irrespective of whether the parties 
opted for or against determining how best to govern a conflicts issue.  
There may be fear that imposition of a rule absent party choice judicializes147 the 
arbitral forum, allowing the house to serve as the final legal body that reviews the 
agreement to determine if the parties made an express choice of law determination 
on conflicts. I disagree. The addition of the default house rule does not trump 
freedom of contract and does not interfere on party choice.148 Here, however, the 
new rule is a default rule, and it is not designed to eliminate the default rules 
already agreed to by the parties to govern their contract. Instead, this rule permits 
freedom of contract to continue and only arises when parties have not made choice 
of law clear to govern conflicts of law for the arbitration. Additionally, the default 
rules that the parties set forth to govern their contract are not being subjected to 
 
 144. See Jack Graves, Arbitration as Contract: The Need for a Fully Developed and Comprehensive Set of 
Statutory Default Legal Rules, 2 WM. & MARY BUS L. REV. 225, 249 (2011). 
 145. Ware, supra note 138, at 740.  
 146. Id.  
 147. See Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration – What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1045 (1960) (“Sometimes 
arbitration is cited as being a ‘quasi-judicial tribunal’ and arbitrators as being ‘judges’ of the parties’ choosing, 
‘judicial officers’ or officers exercising ‘judicial functions.’”). 
 148. Ware, supra note 138, at 739 (“The essence of a mandatory rule is that it trumps freedom of 
contract.”).  Here, however, the new rule is a default rule, and it is not designed to eliminate the default rules 
already agreed to by the parties to govern their contract. Instead, this rule permits freedom of contract to 
continue and only arises when parties have not made choice of law clear to govern conflicts of law for the 
arbitration. 
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arbitral review.149 In this instance, judicial review and arbitral review are 
interchangeable, in that the arbitration house is not functioning as a courthouse. 
Lastly, the arbitral tribunal is not applying mandatory public law to override the 
parties’ contract because they did not choose how to govern conflicts of law 
issues.150 Instead, the default house rule exists only to explain how the arbitration 
house proceeds if this situation arises. Whether the arbitration house opts for the 
seat of arbitration151 to be the controlling standard or looks to see if the parties 
added an exclusive jurisdiction clause,152 a house default rule will not inhibit the 
parties’ freedom to contract in any way while simultaneously providing a clarifying 
standard that arbitration houses will follow.  
4. Strengthening Dispute Resolution: The House Default Rule Fills the Gap 
As with any newly proposed rule, an overarching consideration must be whether 
the rule improves upon the current situation when parties do not make an express 
choice governing conflicts of law. History informs us that if the parties did not intend 
to make an express choice governing conflicts of law, then either one or both parties 
may have had a reason not to.153 This type of default is referred to as a penalty 
default.154 However, to repel this maneuver, two scholars suggested that “courts 
should choose defaults that are different from what the parties would have 
wanted.”155 
If courts can be called upon to counter the will of a more knowledgeable party 
seeking to hide information from the other, then this check can be extended to 
arbitration houses. Unlike courts, which would evaluate the merits of hiding the 
 
 149. Id. (“Unless the agreement calls for it, arbitration claims arising under default rules should not be 
subject to judicial review for errors of law.”). 
 150. See generally Mohammad Reza Baniassadi, Do Mandatory Rules of Public Law Limit Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 10 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 59, 59 (1992) (explaining that “an arbitrator who 
decides to apply the mandatory rules of public law faces three problems: 1) party perception that mandatory 
rules of public law are an unnecessary interference with formation and performance of international contracts; 
2) conflicts between the underlying public policy and the contracting parties’ will; and 3) enforceability of the 
arbitration award.”). 
 151. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3–42 
(4th ed. 2004) (discussing how in international commercial arbitration, gaps are filled by reference to the 
presiding arbitration law—normally that of the place of arbitration.). 
 152. See England and Whales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions, supra note 86 and Greenaway, supra 
note 100 (referencing the exclusive jurisdiction clause in SulAmérica and how it did not affect the parties’ desire 
to arbitrate in a particular seat). 
 153. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 100 (1989) (“The knowledgeable party may not wish to reveal her information in 
negotiations if the information would give a bargaining advantage to the other side.”). 
 154. Id. at 91 (“Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to 
contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.”). 
 155. Id. at 103. 
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information on legal grounds, arbitration houses, as a-national bodies of law, can 
simply craft a default house rule that prevents this issue from occurring in the first 
place. In the case of a party that does not want its reasons known for failing to make 
an express choice of law determination on conflicts, the arbitration house can make 
a policy determination and say that “in some instances, a particular party may need 
to acquire certain types of information before contracting, so that forcing disclosure 
would have minimal disincentive effects.”156 In adopting the house default rule, 
arbitration houses could “deter[] inefficient gaps at the least social cost,”157 
preserving party autonomy to contract with each other without subjugating both 
parties and the house itself to confusion in terms of which rule to apply when 
parties do not make a clear choice on laws governing conflicts.  
Although the prevailing thought in arbitration is that party autonomy is 
sacrosanct, for arbitration houses to avoid unpredictability, filling in the gaps in 
rules is critical. Much like “courts need to establish … rules for deciding when a 
contract is incomplete,”158 arbitration houses should be determined to plug holes 
in their own rules. Doing so will create “‘safeharbors’ [sic] of contractual 
language”159 that alert parties, both knowledgeable and lacking, to the simplicity 
and directness of arbitrating in a particular seat. This gap filling process will 
undoubtedly strengthen arbitration while simultaneously ensuring that the house 
respects party choice to contract out of anything besides the house default rule.  
CONCLUSION 
Arbitration houses do not have rules when parties do not make an express choice 
on conflict of laws. The lack of rules adds to the chaotic nature and unpredictability 
of arbitral results. By compelling arbitration houses to adopt a house default rule 
on conflicts of laws absent party choice, arbitration houses can flesh out a uniform 
rule, increase competition amongst the other arbitration houses, protect party 
autonomy, and bring stability to the arbitration rules governing conflicts of laws.  
 
 
 156. Id. at 107. 
 157. Id. at 98. 
 158. Id. at 119. 
 159. Id. at 123. 
